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An Appeal 



TO THE 



President and The People 



OF THE 



United States 
of America 



IN BEHALF OF 



Jugoslav Nation 



Supplementary Issue of 

The Jugoslav Review 

Official Organ of the Jugoslav Republican Alliance 

3639 W. 26th Street, Chicago, 111. 

Vol. III.— No. 8 



To Wood row Wilson, 
The President of the United States, 
The White House, 
Washington, D. C. 

Mr. President: — 

The undersigned duly authorized representatives of national organizations with a member- 
ship of over 300,000 Americans of Serb, Croat and Slovene origin, have this day assembled in Washing- 
ton to express to you jointly their gratitude and confidence, at the same time voicing the sentiments 
ot 500,000 more of their fellow men of like extraction not officially represented. 

Just as deeply grateful as we are, just as highly confident are we that you are determined 
to let your lotty ideals and just principles be the controlling factors of the ultimate settlement of 
the Adriatic question. 

The attached memoriam, respectfully submitted, voices our sentiments and convictions 
based upon a thorough knowledge of the territories involved and the inhabitants therein and our 
desire to be as just and fair towards others as we want others to be toward us. 

Only upon such basis can a lasting peace be established. That is the kind of peace of which 
you, honored Sir, have been the most potent and sincere advocate. 

With the assurance of our gratitude and confidence we combine our sincere desire for your 
complete and speedy recovery and our pledge of unswerving allegiance and support. 

Your most obedient servants, 

THE JUGOSLAV REPUBLICAN ALLIANCE, Chicago. 

(Jugoslovansko Republicansko Zdruzenje) 
By Etbin Kristan, Director and Chairman of Delegation. 
By A. H. Skubic, Asst. Secretary and Secretary of Delegation. 

THE JUGOSLAV SOCIALIST FEDERATION, Chicago 

(Jugoslovanska Soc. Zveza) 

By Matt Petrovcic, Representing, 

SLOVENIC NATIONAL BENEFIT SOCIETY, Chicago 

(Slovenska Narodna Podporna Jednota) 

By Vincent Cainker, President, 

By Matt Petrovcic, Pres. Board Trustees. 

SOUTH SLAVONIC CATHOLIC UNION, Ely, Minn. 
(Jugoslovanska Katoliska Jednota) 
By Geo. L. Brozich, Treasurer. 

SLAVONIC WORKINGMEN'S BENEFIT UNION, of Penna. 

(Slovanska Delavska Podporna Zveza) 

By William Sitter, Member Supreme Committee. 

SOUTH SLAVONIC BEN. UNION "SLOGA", Milwaukee. 
(Jugoslovanska Podp. Zveza "Sloga") 
By John J. Grgurevich, Representing. 

SLOVENIC PROGRESSIVE BENEFIT SOCIETY, Chicago 
(Slovenska Svobodom. Podporna Zveza) 
By A. H. Skubic, Representing. 

NATIONAL CROATIAN SOCIETY of Pittsburgh, Pa. 
(Narodna Hrvatska Zajednica) 
By Jos. Marohnic, President. 

CROATIAN LEAGUE OF ILLINOIS, Chicago. 
(Hrvatska Zajednica Illinois) 
By Peter Badovinac, Treasurer. 

CROATIAN FALCON SOCIETY "TOMISLAV", 
By John J. Grgurevich, Representing. 

SERB FEDERATION "SLOGA", New York, 
(Saves Sjedinjenih Srba "Sloga") 
By M. I. Pupin, President. 

Washington, D. C. March qth'ioio. n 

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THE problem of the Adriatic provinces, which affects the vital interests of the Jugoslavs and 
their young State, is evidently approaching some sort of a final solution. Under these cir- 
cumstances Americans of Jugoslav birth, associated in the several Organizations, the names 

of which are signed to this Appeal, consider it their duty to call again to the attention of the 
President and the People of the United States, the territorial necessities of the nation from which 
they sprang and in whose welfare they are naturally deeply interested. 

At the very outset we desire to state as emphatically as we can that the attitude of the Jugo- 
slavs in reference to the disputed territories is not dictated by any ambition for national expansion 
or aggrandizement, but solely by sincere and unshakable belief in the justice and fairness of the terri- 
torial demands of Jugoslavia. 

We also call the attention to the fact that the Adriatic question of today, as well as the other 
(so-called) Balkan questions of the past, which have disturbed the peace of the world during the 
last century, have been, and are the outgrowth, not so much of local conditions, as of interference 
and desire of conquest on the part of outside nations. 

To be sure, there have been numerous controversies and disagreements among the various 
nationalities inhabiting the Balkans, but most of them could have been settled without difficulty, 
and none of them would have been dangerous to the peace of the world, had it not been for the in- 
trigues of autocratic powers which were gazing with eager eyes upon the Balkans and trying to create 
disputes as a pretext for interference and annexation. 

The history of these intrigues and their consequences is too well known to need repetition 
They finally culminated in, and were the direct cause of the great war which resulted in sacrifices 
of life and treasure such as the world never witnessed before. 

Would it not be reasonable to suppose that in view of the lessons of this war, further attempts 
at arbitrary annexation of Balkan territory by outside nations should be discouraged, alike in justice 
to the Balkan nations themselves, and in the interest of world peace? 

The Jugoslav nation will not, and never can rest content and be satisfied with an arrangement 
under which a large part of it will be compelled to live under a foreign yoke. For centuries they 
opposed such conditions tenaciously, clung to their nationality and language, and maintained them 
against the ruthless domination of the Hapsburg dynasty. When the opportunity came to break 
away from the yoke of the oppressor, they enthusiastically embraced it, helped to disorganize the 
Austrian army and navy, and finally, rose in open revolt the very moment when it became apparent 
that there was chance of success. In the well known conference at Rome in the summer of 1917. 
the representatives of the Jugoslavs promised this aid to the Italians, and the Jugoslavs made their 
promise good. They expect the Italians to live up to their promise made at the same conference. 
Instead of that the Italians demand that a large portion of the Jugoslav nation be again subjected 
to a foreign yoke at the very moment, when, as the fruit of victory, liberty and self-determination 
should be the reward of the Jugoslavs. 

We have nothing but sympathy for Italy's claims to that part of the Austrian monarchy, 
which was populated by Italians and which was torn from Italy by conquest, but we emphatically 
protest against Italy committing the same wrong against Jugoslavia which she so greatly and justly 
resented when it was committed by Austria against her. 

The territory in dispute between'Italy and Jugoslavia is overwhelmingly inhabited by Jugo- 
slavs. To be sure, there are some cities included in this territory in which the Italians predominate. 
But, is it not likewise true that in the territory, which until this war, formed part of Italy and the 
annexation of which by Italy is not disputed by Jugoslavia, there are located many cities and dis- 
tricts in which Jugoslavs constitute a great majority? 

Italy claims the provinces now in dispute by right of the London agreement, a secret compact 
which attempted to deal with the Jugoslavs and their territory on the old basis of conquest which 
had no consideration for the rights of the inhabitants of the conquered territory. As between Italy 



and her allies on the one hand, and the central empires on the other hand, there might have been 
nothing wrong in an insistence upon the terms of this compact. But when the Jugoslavs rose in 
rebellion against the Austrian oppressor and the Austrian empire collapsed as a result of this re- 
bellion then the Jugoslavs are eminently entitled to make a claim that the principle of self-determina- 
tion be applied to them in the partition of the former Austrian empire. Besides, the call had gone 
forth to all the world that the great war against the central powers was a war for liberty and for the 
self-determination of oppressed nations. Jugoslavia had a right to suppose that this call was made 
honestly, and that those who issued the call, and became parties to it, would be bound by the prin- 
ciples announced in it. How then can Italy now revert to any supposed rights under the secret 
London agreement, the terms of which are contrary to the avowed aims of the world war on which 
Jugoslavia relied in joining forces with Italy and her allies for the overthrow of the Austrian and 
German monarchies. 

The sacrifices offered by Jugoslavia for liberty and unity were out-right enormous in Serbia, 
whose martyrdom is known the world over. They were hardly less in the other territories inhabited 
by Jugoslavs. But the Jugoslav people never wavered in their determination. Before their eyes 
shone the bright light of liberty, and in their ears rang the glad gospel of democracy and self-deter- 
mination of nations of which President Wilson had become the foremost apostle. These principles 
embodied the very fundamental political ideals for fulfillment of which the Jugoslavs had struggled 
for generations before the great war, as well as during the war, as much as it was possible under the 
hard conditions then prevailing, in the face of persecution, cruel internment of "suspects", martial 
law and innumerable executions for disaffection to the oppressor. Italy was more benefited by 
these sacrifices on the part of the Jugoslavs than any other nation engaged in the struggles against 
the central empires. What monstrous mockery of justice and principle would it be to permit now, 
Italy to perpetrate upon Jugoslavia the same kind of an outrage that she complained of against her 
late enemy, the Austrian empire 1 

Italy is the last nation on earth that could claim ignorance in respect to the conditions of the 
Austrian monarchy and concerning the fact that the Jugoslavs constituted a subjugated nation, 
yearning for liberty. The national struggles in the grotesque dual monarchy were too intense to 
escape observation by all the world. A voluminous literature about them was a matter of comment, 
and it would be an insult to Italian intelligence to suppose that Italy was ignorant of the national 
aspirations of the Jugoslavs. In fact, so much so was Italy aware of the desires of Jugoslavia to 
become independent that during the first month of the war the Italian press devoted special attention 
to the probability of a Jugoslav rebellion. Why then should Italy feign surprise at the stand which 
Jugoslavia took, after the war, for national unity, self-determination and liberty? 

While Jugoslavia stands firmly in the defense of her rights against the infringements thereof 
by Italy, it should be understood that this stand does not in any way involve any enmity against 
Italy or against the Italians. 

It was always as clear as day that the Jugoslavs and the Italians would become neighbc s, 
who in many respects would have to depend one upon the other, and that both would derive gr.at 
advantages from the elimination of antagonism. Not only that, but it was clear that under any ""air 
adjustment of boundaries between these nations, there would remain certain fractions of natior als 
of each in the territory of the other. Consideration for these nationals, and the general advantages 
to be derived from friendly intercourse and commerce, constitute a bond of mutual friendship which 
is strengthened by many sympathies and ancient traditions. 

But friendship between nations can not endure against deliberate aggression and manifest 
wrong, and nothing less is involved in the present attitude of Italy, in view of the overwhelming 
preponderance of Jugoslavs in the population of the disputed territory, which even Italy does no 
longer deny. This preponderance has been absolutely established by the oft repeated Austrian 
census, which in each instance was manipulated so as to show' the least possible number of Jugoslavs, 
but nevertheless demonstrated each time their overwhelming preponderance, as it was well known to 
every expert of the Paris Peace Conference. 

Now indeed, it has been claimed by the apologists for Italian aggression that whatever the 
nationality of the inhabitants of the disputed territory may be, they prefer to become subjects of 
Italy rather than to be embodied into the Jugoslav State. In support of this contention these apolo- 
gists aver that the Jugoslavs by no means are a homogeneous people, but are divided by differences 
in language, customs and sympathy, so great, that really little affinity exists between the inhabitants 
of the disputed territory and the remainder of Jugoslavia. 

As to this contention it may be conceded that for centuries Jugoslavia was politically divided 
by foreign rule into several distinct units. That these units were again subdivided into minor frac- 
tions; that all sorts of artificial barriers were set up for the purpose of estranging the various elements 



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of the nation from each other; that to a certain extent these schemes were successful, and have resulted 
in local linguistic differences, literature, customs and sympathy which will in a large extent persist 
even after national political unity has been attained. 

Thus for instance, the Slovenes who occupy chiefly the western part of Jugoslavia, are now- 
separated from the Croats and Serbs by local linguistic and literary differences which are the result 
of age-long division. But it by no means hinders the Slovenes from being enthusiastic supporters 
of Jugoslav political unity. In fact, it is precisely the Slovenes who are the most bitter antagonists 
of the proposed annexation of the disputed territory to Italy; this, for the reason that the vast ma- 
jority of the Jugoslavs in this territory are Slovenes, and its annexation to Italy would involve the 
political separation of about thirty per cent of all Slovenes from Jugoslavia. 

Italy herself knows this well, and for that reason has steadfastly rejected every proposition 
for a plebiscite, to be conducted under international supervision, by which any doubt of Outsiders 
concerning the wishes of the inhabitants of the disputed territory, as to future political allegiance, 
could readily be removed. 

Now, as to concrete consequences which are at stake for Jugoslavia in the proposed annexation 
of the disputed territory to Italy. 

For the Slovenes it would involve the political severance of a population of about four hundred 
thousand from their total number of only about one and one-half millions, — enough to deal a crushing 
blow to the whole cultural and literary life of that unit of the Jugoslavs, which on account of its 
limited number, was always at a great disadvantage in the matter of literary production, but never- 
theless attained an honorable position among cultured nations in arts, literature and general culture, 
— contrary to the false legends about the primitive condition of the Jugoslavs through which a mali- 
cious propaganda has endeavored to discredit them politically. 

It should not be forgotten that for a long time to come the Slovenes will have to use the literary 
apparatus which they now possess, and that to cut off from these people, numbering now only a total 
of one and one-half million, almost one-third of their number, means to deal them a most cruel cultural 
blow and to reduce the chances for their cultural progress to a minimum. 

While this blow would primarily be felt by the Slovenes, it would nevertheless re-act upon the 
whole cultural life of Jugoslavia. Furthermore, the political separation of so large a portion of the 
Jugoslav nation from its body, would involve a constant irritation of the whole nation, and would 
deflect a very large portion of its mental energies from their normal tasks to the maintainance of a 
perpetual agitation for the reunion of the lost provinces to the body of the nation. 

Everybody in Europe knows how deeply such movements affected the whole mental life of 
France and Italy; and yet the number of Frenchmen and Italians who were politically separated 
from France and Italy by forcible annexations on the part of Germany and Austria, was propor- 
tionately much smaller than the number of Jugoslavs which would be separated from their own 
nation by the proposed forcible annexation of the disputed territory to Italy. 

The direct economic consequences of the annexation of the disputed territory to Italy will be 
even more disastrous to Jugoslavia than its cultural effects. The interests involved are in fact, so 
large that it is quite evident that the desire of Italy for the annexation of this territory is founded 
chiefly on economic considerations. 

The possession of the disputed territory involves in the first place the control and direct exploi- 
tation of large natural resources of the territory itself. 

There are large deposits of coal and iron ore in the disputed territory which have been to some 
extent developed, but are susceptible of much greater development. 

Large forests of excellent timber are also contained in the disputed territory, and the agri- 
cultural and pastural wealth of the territory is very considerable. 

After all, the most important economic consequences for Jugoslavia involved in the annexation 
of the disputed territory to Italy pertain to transportation and commerce. The proposed annexation 
does not only deprive Jugoslavia of the control of the railroads which have their terminals at Trieste, 
but also takes away from the new State the control of the major portion of the great double-track 
railway from Ljubljana (Laibach) to Rijeka (Fiume), and deprives it likewise of the sea terminal 
of the other great double-track railroad which leads from Zagreb (Agram) to Rijeka (Fiume). 

Furthermore, the harbors at Trieste and Fiume are the only good harbors on the whole Eastern 
Adriatic coast, which are provided, and can be provided with first class railroad connections. Their 
possession involves not only a grip on the transportation system and commerce of Jugoslavia, but on 
that of the whole country beyond, in so far as an outlet to the Adriatic is concerned. 



Considering the fact that Italy had nothing to do with the development of the means of the 
transportation of Jugoslavia and the country beyond; that free and untrammeled access to the sea 
is the first condition necessary for the sound economic development of any nation; that important 
questions will be involved between Jugoslavia and the country beyond in reference to transportation 
to the Adriatic; and that in respect to these Jugoslavia should not be hampered by interference of a 
third power, it is impossible to exaggerate the economic consequences involved for Jugoslavia in the 
control, by Italy, of her most important natural outlets and terminals. 

Italy indeed is willing to concede to Jugoslavia a few southern seaports, which have poor 
railroad connections with the commercial and industrial centers of Jugoslavia. 

To establish Jugoslavia as a nation and at the same time take away from her the full control 
of her principal means of communication would be a tragic irony. Under present day economic 
conditions, control of railroad terminals, and free access to the sea are among the most essential factors 
of sound economic life. 

Italy has tried and is trying, to excuse her occupation of the disputed territory, her appro- 
priation of its resources, and her incidental strangling hold on the commercial outlets to the Me- 
diterranean, of Jugoslavia and of the immense territory beyond, by strategical considerations, on 
the ground that the occupation of this territory by Italy is necessary in order to secure the safety of 
her Northeastern boundary, and her control of the Adriatic. These excuses have no sound basis in 
actual conditions. 

First of all, the former Austria, who was a menace to all her,neighbors, is no more. Jugoslavia 
is a comparatively small state with no ambitions for territory beyond that in which her own nationals 
constitute a great majority. The possession of the territory now in dispute would satisfy her as far 
as her western boundaries are concerned. There would then be no reason why the future relations 
between Jugoslavia and Italy should not be most amicable and harmonious. Italy being so much 
stronger, in population, wealth and resources, than Jugoslavia it would be practically out of the 
question that Jugoslavia should ever attack Italy without the most flagrant provocation. Any such 
action would involve only the greatest failure for Jugoslavia. As to any attack from beyond the 
borders of Jugoslavia, Italy would be much better protected by a contended and friendly Jugoslavia 
than by the possession of a mere few additional mountain tops and deep rivers. The experiences 
of the last war in particular have demonstrated that in war, menpower, morale, training, technical 
knowledge and equipment are of infinitely greater importance than strategical position. 

Again, this strategical argument ought to work both ways. If powerful Italy, in order to 
protect herself, immediately after the conclusion of a great war for liberty and justice, has to rob a 
weaker, friendly nation who joined with her in her struggle against the rapacious Hapsburgs, of part 
of her heritage, are not strategical advantages required for that weaker nation against such a neighbor 1 

Is control of the railroad from Laibach to Fiume, and the country to the west, dominating it' 
more essential to the security of Italy from Jugoslavia, or to the security of Jugoslavia from Italy 1 
Is the possession of the heights a few miles west from Upper Laibach, within gun range of Laibach. 
the capital of Slovenia, more essential to the security of Italy than that of Jugoslavia? These questions 
answer themselves. Many more might be asked of the same import, and to the same effect. It is 
plain as day that what is claimed as necessary for the safety of Italy, would be in fact a most serious 
and constant threat against Jugoslavia, amounting to military domination over the whole northwestern 
part of the country. 

As to the Adriatic, Italy has announced the peculiar doctrine that she must control and dom- 
inate it. Upon what just foundation can any such claim be based? Are not the nations to the 
North and East as much entitled to share in free and untrammeled access to, and control of their 
side of the Adriatic as Italy? Did Italy dig the Adriatic Sea, or was it provided by Providence? 
Are the harbors and islands on the East coast of the Adriatic more essential to Italy than to Jugo- 
slavia? Are they not in justice and equity, part and parcel of the Country of which they form a 
part and which they adjoin, and of the people which live in them 1 

By what right can Italy presume to project herself between Jugoslavia and the outside world 
and seek to control the communciations of Jugoslavia, and the countries to the North and East of 
her, and shut them off from untrammeled intercourse with friendly nations beyond the seas. 

We resent such attitude and presumption not only on behalf of the land of our birth, but 
particularly also as citizens of these great United States, whose interests are vitally affected whenever 
any power attempts to interfere with their free and untrammeled communication, commercial or 
otherwise, with other nations. 

It is to be rightfully assumed that the people of Jugoslavia will never voluntarily acknowledge 
the present unjust pretentions on the part of Italy, and that if their government should be forced to 



abide by them for the time being, or to become a party to a pact by which they are recognized, the 
Jugoslav people will in all probability never consider such a pact as morally binding upon them. 
A Jugoslav Irredenta will unquestionably spring into existence, and the sentiment of outraged right, 
permeating the Jugoslav nation, will make a fertile ground for incitement too dangerous adventure. 

Let there be no mistake about the fact that a just and proper settlement of the controversy 
between Italy and Jugoslavia is of the utmost importance, not only for the welfare of Jugoslavia, 
but also for the welfare of Italy and for the peace of Europe, and, further, that if the Italian rule is 
established in the dominating part of the Balkans, the seed of the disagreement is sown among the 
world powers, which at present may seem disinterested, but will sooner or later show the sign of 
interest, if Italy should happen to have a special position, constantly provoking imperialistic ten- 
dencies. Italy's demands on the eastern shores of the Adriatic is a serious question, but of greater 
importance is the question of what will she be forced to demand as soon as her foot is planted on 
the Balkan soil. Her first step can not be the last, even though her present rulers may have no 
farther reaching aims. Italy's demands point with clarity to her ambitions for a complete and un- 
deniable control of the Adriatic, and should she succeed in this, economic interests will force her to 
get and keep the control of the hinterland, without which she could not have much benefit from the 
control of the sea. 

It is for this reason that we consider it our solemn duty to give again expression to the fore- 
going considerations before the pending controversy is finally disposed of. It is our most sincere 
desire that a strong foundation be laid for future amicable relations between nations, especially be- 
tween Jugoslavia and Italy. We are firm in our conviction that we are asking for nothing but what 
is fair and right. If the irrefutably just demands of the Jugoslavs are granted they will be completely 
satisfied and will eagerly concentrate all their powers on the urgent work of political, economic, tech- 
nical and cultural reconstruction at home which will furnish an ample field for the employment of 
all their powers. But only from a basis of justice, real friendship and mutual trust can such a con- 
dition be evolved, and only on such a basis can the glorious ideals be realized for which humanity 
has bled and died. 

Washington, D. C. March gth, 1920. 

THE JUGOSLAV REPUBLICAN ALLIANCE: 
By ETBIN KRISTAN, 
Director and Chairman of Delegation. 

By A. H. SKUBIC, 

Asst. Secy and Secretary of Del. 

THE JUGOSLAV SOCIALIST FEDERATION: 
By MATT. PETROVCIC, 
Representing. 

SLOVENIC NATIONAL BENEFIT SOCIETY: 
By VINCENT CAINKAR, 

Supreme President. 

By MATT. PETROVCIC, 

President Board of Trustees. 

SOUTH SLAVONIC CATHOLIC UNION: 
By GEO. L. BROZICH, 

Supreme Treasurer. 

SLAVONIC WORKINGMEN'S BENEFIT UNION: 
By WILLIAM SITTER, 

Member Supreme Committee. 



mi 111 1 mill iiiiimiiiii 
020 930 638 4 

SOUTH SLAVONIC BENEFIT UNION "SLOGA"- 
By JOHN J. GRGUREVICH, 
Representing. 

SLOVENIC PROGRESSIVE BENEFIT SOCIETY: 
By A. H. SKUBIC, 

Representing. 

NATIONAL CROATIAN SOCIETY: 
By JOS. MAROHNIC, 

Supreme President. 

CROATIAN LEAGUE OF ILLINOIS: 
By PETER BADOVINAC, 
Treasurer. 

CROATIAN FALCON SOCIETY "TOMISLAV": 
By JOHN J. GRGUREVICH, 
Representing. 

SERB FEDERATION SLOGA: 
By M. I. PUP IN, 

Supreme President. 




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